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value, in addition to the percentage, which attitude negatives the purpose
of such leases.
4. The difficulty of the small merchant in estimating properly the
amount of percentage he can reasonably pay.

It is quite likely that not only in Denver, but throughout the metro,
politan area, percentage leases will come more and more into use, particularly
with the expansion, of chain stores. Both the real estate agent and lawyer
will do well in giving study and attention to this type of leasing. It must
be understood, however, that such leasing can apply successfully only with
a limited class of tenants.
What has here been presented is not to be taken as a critical review of
the present leasing methods, but rather as a means of implementing in our
minds the vast changes in commercial life and the steady progress toward
a business relationship built upon fairness and equity-a relationship not
based on the doctrine of caveat emptor but seeking only mutual and common
benefits.

Has The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Been
Abandoned in Colorado?
By

GEORGE

T.

EVANS

of the Denver Bar

In the' British-American system of jurisprudence, precedent is important.
History discloses that since the days of the Year Books (1290-1535) lawyers
and judges have been assiduously engaged not only in making the law consistent within itself but even in developing the "mechanical" means requisite
to insure and facilitate that consistency. Lord Coke, who died in 1634, said
that "Out of the old fields must spring the new corn," I and it is a known
fact that much of his writing was devoted to collecting, classifying and reconciling old cases from the Year Books and other sources, so that the bench and
bar of his day could have at hand the ancient authorities in point in their own
cases. By Blackstone's time (1728-1780) this adherence to precedent seems
to have developed into the doctrine, modernly called stare decisis, for he is
reported 2 to have said:
"For it is an established rule to abide former precedents where the
same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice
even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion;
as also the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what
was before uncertain and perhaps indifferent is now become a permanent
rule which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary
from according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine not
according to his own private judgment but according to the known laws
1. Co. Rep. (Pref.)
2. Cooleys Blackstone, 4 Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 70-71.
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and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce new law but to
expound the old * * *
"The doctrine of the law is this: That precedents and rules must
be followed unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though their reason be
not obvious at first view, we owe such deference to former times as not
to suppose that they acted wholly without consideration, * * *"
In more recent times a judge of the highest court in Connecticut showed
the necessity for respecting precedent in deciding current cases in the following words:
"If the law, well established, may be annulled by an opinion, a foundation is laid for the most reckless instability * * * No system of inflexible adherence to established law can be as pernicious as such ceaseless
and interminable fluctuations." 3
These earlier views of the beneficent doctrine we now call stare decisis
have persisted in high places. Mr. Justice White (later Mr. Chief Justice
White) of the Supreme Court of the United States, said in a dissenting
opinion:
"The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one hedged
about by precedents which are binding on the court, without regard to
the personality of its members. Break down this belief in judicial continuity and let it be felt that on great constitutional questions this court
is to depart from the settled conclusions of its predecessors and to determine them according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill
its bench and our constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value
and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of
the people." 4
In 1913 the Supreme Court of Colorado had before it the question of
whether or not article XX of the Constitution of Colorado (the home rule
amendment) conferred upon the City of Denver exclusive power to regulate
the sale of intoxicating liquors within its boundaries as against a state law then
5
inforce.
In holding that article XX of the Constitution (the home rule amendment) did not give Denver any such power, the court said in part:
"The regulation of the liquor traffic is certainly a matter of concern
and great importance to the people of the entire state, and there is
nothing in the language of article XX to justify the assumption that they
intended to relinquish the right to legislate concerning it in any portion
of the state. This position is further strengthened by the fact that heretofore exclusive local regulation had been given to Denver and other
cities, but thereafter these acts had been amended so that when article
3.

Hosmer, C. J., in Palmers Admr. v. Mead (1828)

7 Conn. 149,

157, 158.

4. Pollock vs. Farmers L & T Co. (1895) 1.57 U. S., 427, 651, 652.
5. Walker vs. People (1913) 55 Colo. 402.
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XX was adopted Denver's regulation of the liquor traffic was then subject to the existing laws of the state. Under such circumstances and in
the absence of some language in article XX to indicate the contrary, we
cannot believe that it was intended to divest the state of its entire
jurisdiction in this territory upon this important subject." 6
Thus Denver's assertion as a home rule city in 1913 that it had exclusive
control of the regulation of the liquor traffic within its borders was overruled
by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Again in 1936 this conflict between a home rule city and the state came
before the Supreme Court. There the question was whether the legislature
by statute could direct the disposition of certain beer license fees collected by
Colorado Springs (a home rule city under article XX). The court held that
the power of the legislature was paramount over the regulation of the liquor
traffic in all its phases and that this was especially true since the people bf
Colorado in 1932 adopted article XXII of the constitution. Mr. Justice
Burke, for the court, said in part:
"These questions are disposed of by amended article XXII of the
constitution * * *. By its provisions the regulation of the manufacture
and sale of 'all intoxicating liquors' became 'exclusively' the subject of
,statutory laws' from July 1, 1933. If this chapter conflicts in any way
with said section 6 of article XX or said section 11 of article II, those
were, to that extent, amended by it. Thereby the regulation and sale of
intoxicating liquor passed under the exclusive control of the legislature." T
Thus it was decided that, whatever the situation before presently subsisting article XXII became part of the Constitution of Colorado, thereafter
the power of the legislature to regulate liquor throughout the length and
breadth of Colorado was paramount, supreme and all-inclusive, and, indeed,
in view of the wording of article XXII such a view seems unassailable. Article
XXII, so far as material here, is as follows:
"* * * from and after July 1, 1933, the manufacture, sale and dis,
tribution of all intoxicating liquors wholly within the State of Colorado,
shall, subject to the constitution and laws of the United States, be per,
formed exclusively by or through such agencies and under such regulations
as may hereafter be provided by statutory laws of the State of Colorado;
In 1939 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the case of Denver vs. the
People,s involving practically the same question as that in the Colorado
Springs case, supra, and arrived at the same conclusion as in the Colorado
Springs case. In the course of its opinion the court said:
"No one would seriously contend that the granting of licenses for
6. Ibid., 406.
7. City of Colo. Springs vs. People (1936) 99 Colo. 525, 527.
8. Denver vs. People, 103 Colo. 565.
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the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not an incident of the
liquor traffic and controllable as such." 9
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Bakke.
On December 31, 1946, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
a case which involved a conflict between the right of Denver as a home rule
city and the power of the legislature under article XXII of the constitution
to designate the liquor licensing authority for Denver. 10 By section 9 of the
Liquor Code of 1935, the legislature designated the city council as Denver's
licensing instrumentality. It said:
"Section 9.* * * Where the license fee is to be paid into the treasury of any * * * city and county the licenses in this act provided for
shall be issued by the council in a city and county * * *"
There was no dispute as to the intention of the legislature, as expressed
in section 9 of the Liquor Code, above noted. The argument for Denver
was that the legislature was powerless, in view of the home rule provisions of
article XX, to designate any particular instrumentality of the City and County
of Denver as its liquor licensing authority. And the Supreme Court sustained
that view in a four to three decision," the opinion being written by Mr. Justice Hilliard. In part the court said:
"* * * we conclude the general assembly properly has required the
City and County of Denver to discharge the duty of receiving, considering, and acting upon applications submitted by those seeking licenses to
dispense liquors within its territory, as contemplated in the Liquor Code
of 1935; but, the * * * agency through which that public entity shall
perform and discharge such assigned duty is within the City and County's
keeping, that is to say, through appropriate charter enactment. It follows
that since Denver, proceeding so, as we have seen, has created an office
or agency called manager of safety and excise, to the occupant of which
it has assigned all licensing authority, only that official, and not the city
council, has authority to act upon applications of the nature of the one
here under consideration, and issue, or refuse to grant, licenses for the
sale of intoxicating liquors in the City and County of Denver.
"Moreover, we are disposed to the view that perforce another
provision of the constitution, although not cited or argued, the statutory
section involved, in so far as it applies to the City and County of Denver,
* * * is void."
The court then goes on to mention the fact that since Denver is the only
city and county in the state and since the absolute requirement of section 9
that the city council in a city and county be the liquor licensing authority,
9. Ibid., 571.
10. Reed v. Blakley, et al, (Dec. 31, 1946; Rehearing denied Jan. 11, 1947),
115 Colo. 5 9.
11. Ibid., The majority: Justices Bakke, Burke, Hilliard, Luxford. (Dissenting:
Justices Knous, Jackson, Stone)
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such legislation was special as to Denver and therefore contrary to article V,
section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado.
Article V was part of the original constitution adopted in 1876. Article
XXII, authorizing the liquor traffic in Colorado and providing that the general
assembly should regulate it, was adopted in 1932. Article XXII is not mentioned or referred to in the Reed decision. Walker v. People (1913), supra,
holding that article XX gives Denver no right to control liquor within its
borders; City of Colorado Springs v. People (1936), supra, and Denver v.
People, (1939), supra, (the latter two decisions holding that article XXII
gave the general assembly complete, plenary and all-inclusive power over
liquor regulation' in all of Colorado) were neither applied, distinguished, modified, overruled or commented on.
And so far as article V, section 25 is concerned, it has been construed
by the Supreme Court in a number of cases beginning in 1884 12 and continuing down to 1943,' l in all of which it has been held that the question of
whether a general or a special law can be made applicable to a.given situation
is for legislative determination and that courts can interfere only where there
is a clear abuse of discretion by the legislature. No such abuse is found by the
court in the Reed case, but that portion of section 9 of the Liquor Code was,
nevertheless struck down.
Has the doctrine of stare decisis been abandoned in Colorado?
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A. WALSH has become a member of the firm of Miller and McKinley
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12. Brown v. Denver (1884) 7 Colo. 305.
13.

McClain v. People (1943)

111 Colo. 271.

